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4.1  Introduction 
Over the past  two-and-a-half decades trade in  textile  and apparel 
products has evolved from a trade environment, encumbered only by 
high tariffs, to a system of  regulations that includes both high tariffs and 
ever more restrictive bilateral import quotas. This multifaceted trade 
management system regulating textile-apparel trade is of  considerable 
interest because it has been credited with providing both a certain degree 
of market certainty and, consequently, an environment in which the U.S. 
textile industry  has found it profitable to undertake  major structural 
changes, which have transformed it from a small-scale, unintegrated, 
predominantly family-owned sector to a large-scale, more concentrated, 
capital-intensive, technologically advanced, and internationally competi- 
tive industry.' As such, the experience of  the U.S. textile and apparel 
industries in repeatedly requesting and obtaining continued protection, 
as well  as in  implementing major structural adjustments, may  be an 
important precedent for other so-called crisis industries who are now 
attempting to restructure U .S. trade policy in favor of greater protection. 
A number of  basic policy issues are raised by the Multifiber Arrange- 
ment  (MFA) and  its predecessor  agreements. Primary  among these 
issues is the degree to which the existence of  the MFA has resulted in a 
misallocation of  resources in both the developed and developing coun- 
tries. For example, what portion of the average annual capital investment 
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in the textile and apparel industries of $1144.5 and $425.7 million, respec- 
tively, during the 1970-80  period was attributable to the existence of the 
MFA?  At  a more general level,  what impact has the MFA had  on 
industry output, employment, prices, and profits? Another important 
issue concerns the magnitude of  the economic cost of  such an elaborate 
quota system. Clearly many significant issues are raised by the existence 
of this trade management system. A study of  all of  them would require 
resources far beyond those available for this project. Consequently, this 
paper focuses on just one important question raised by U.S. textile and 
apparel quotas, namely, whether these import quotas have served to 
improve the profit performance of  the domestic industry. 
Section 4.2 briefly outlines the history of textile trade regulation. The 
restructuring of  the U.S. and West European textile industries is dis- 
cussed in section 4.3. The methodology by which the marginal impact of 
the MFA on the profitability of  domestic producers will be tested is 
explained in section 4.4. The empirical results are presented in section 
4.5. Concluding remarks are given in section 4.6, and data sources are in 
the appendix. 
4.2  International Regulation of Textile Trade 
For the United States, trade in textile products has always been ex- 
tremely important. In part this was and still is because of the size of  the 
industry, its geographic concentration, its level of  employment, and the 
political power it can wield? The voluntary export controls agreed to by 
Japan in 1957 mark the beginning of  a long list of  international agree- 
ments (in the postwar period)  designed to manage the trade of  both 
textile and apparel products? 
4.2.1  Early Textile Trade Regulation 
In the early 1950s the U.S. textile industry was faced with market 
adjustment problems precipitated by excess capacity in cotton textiles, a 
shift to synthetic fibers, technological changes, and increased imports of 
certain cotton textile products from Japan. As a partial solution to these 
problems  the  industry  began  to seek  protection  from  import  com- 
petition? The primary exporter targeted by  the industry was Japan. In 
response to escape clause actions and fearing legislation authorizing 
import restrictions, Japan in  1957 agreed to a voluntary control of  its 
exports of  cotton textiles and apparel to the United States. While this 
agreement was successful in limiting Japanese exports of cotton products 
to the United States, it encouraged increased imports from new entrants, 
such as Hong Kong, Portugal, Egypt, and India. It soon became obvious 
to the U.S.  administration that  a more  comprehensive  solution was 
necessary to adequately control imports. In particular, the government 113  The Multifiber Arrangement 
desired to avoid legislated import restrictions, preferring instead a legit- 
imatized system of trade restrictions whereby the world market would be 
divided so  that  both  the developing countries and the  industrialized 
countries would share the responsibility of  an “orderly” market suitable 
for the expansion of developing countries and yet minimizing the damage 
to the U.S. market? 
Multilateral discussions, initiated by the United States and designed to 
reorder textile trade in accordance with these objectives, were held under 
the auspices of the GATT beginning on 16 June 1961. These discussions 
led in July 1961  to the first of a series of multilateral arrangements, known 
as the Short-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement (STA), which went into 
effect for one year beginning 1 October 1961. A more comprehensive 
agreement, known as the Long-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles 
(LTA), went into effect for five years on 1 October 1962 and was ex- 
tended twice through 1973. Under the LTA cotton textile imports were 
controlled on an item-by-item basis. 
The signing of  the LTA initiated a departure from GATT rules for 
manufactured goods? Under this agreement importers could apply re- 
straints selectively without  compensation  to exporters.  Furthermore, 
under LTA provisions, unilateral action against an exporter could be 
implemented to cover all cotton exports regardless of whether there was 
any  evidence  of  market  disruption  in  the importing  country.’ As an 
import restricting measure the LTA worked well initially. By 1967 the 
United States had restrained the supply of  specific cotton textile and 
apparel products under article 3 of  the LTA from seventeen of its major 
suppliers. Later that year these same countries accepted bilateral agree- 
ments with the United States under article 4 of  the LTA. By 1972 the 
United States had concluded similar restraining agreements with thirteen 
other countries, bringing the total restraints to thirty suppliers. 
Imports of  man-made fiber textiles and apparel, unlike cotton textiles, 
increased more than ten-fold over the eleven-year life of  the LTA. In 
response to the developing countries’ success in expanding exports of 
man-made apparel, the United States attempted to widen the scope of 
the LTA. In 1971  the United States reached bilateral agreements with its 
principal suppliers, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea, designed to 
control the flow of  wool and man-made textile and apparel products. 
However,  these  restrictions  were  not  justified  under  the  LTA 
framework, and subsequently the United States focused on amending the 
LTA so that it would cover textile and apparel products of all three fibers: 
4.2.2  The Multifiber Arrangement 
Such an expanded agreement was reached on 20 December 1973 by 
some fifty  governments.  This  multilateral  agreement,  known  as the 
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monly the Multifiber Arrangement  (MFA) , became “the statement of 
principle and policy” regarding international textile trade? The MFA 
initially covered the period from 1  January 1974 to 31 December 1977 and 
was later extended, with  some major modifications, first through 31 
December 1981 and later through 31 July 1986. The primary goal of the 
MFA was the fulfillment of  two  conflicting objectives:  to foster the 
expansion of world trade in textiles with particular emphasis on develop- 
ing countries’ exports while, at the same time, preventing disruption of 
developed country markets. 
These MFA objectives are clearly stated in its articles. Article 1  pro- 
vides that the basic objective of the MFA be: “to achieve the expansion of 
trade, the reduction of  barriers to such trade and the progressive liber- 
alization of world trade in textile products while at the same time ensur- 
ing the orderly and equitable development of this trade and avoidance of 
disruptive effects . . .”  Another principal aim of the MFA, also set forth 
in  article  1, is “to  further the economic and  social development of 
developing countries and secure a substantial increase in their export 
earnings from textile products and to provide scope for a greater share for 
them in world trade in these products.” 
Article 1  goes further to state that the safeguards provision of the MFA 
is to be applied in “exceptional circumstances” and is designed to “assist 
any process of adjustment which would be required by the changes in the 
pattern of  world trade in textile products.” 
The extent to which a particular country can impose unilateral control 
is limited to “market disruption,” which is defined in annex A of  the 
agreement as serious damage to the producing industry. Along the gen- 
eral lines of the LTA, initial quotas were to be based on past import levels 
with the exception that these quotas were to grow at a minimum of  6 
percent per annum (annex B of the agreement). Furthermore, provisions 
were made for a transfer of  unused quotas among categories (the so- 
called swing provision) and between years (the so-called carry-over and 
carry-forward provisions)  .‘O 
The MFA further provides in article 6 for special and more favorable 
treatment of new entrants and small suppliers. It also provides for sur- 
veillance procedures by the Textile Surveillance Body composed of both 
developed and developing country members. By 1 October 1977, the 
United States had negotiated bilateral agreements with eighteen coun- 
tries limiting their principal textile exports. Furthermore, through its 
consultation mechanism, the United States had authority to unilaterally 
control imports of  other textile categories considered disruptive. 
While the MFA provides the framework for an “equitable”” regula- 
tion of trade  in textile  products,  the specific implementation of  this 
agreement is dependent on a set of bilateral agreements drawn according 
to article 4  of  the MFA. The United States interpreted this article to 115  The Multifiber Arrangement 
imply that bilateral agreements should provide a more liberal treatment 
of developing country suppliers “on overall terms.” Consequently, under 
most of the bilaterals, within each aggregate limit specific quota levels for 
subgroups and specific quotas for items within subgroups were estab- 
lished. In the event that a particular  item was perceived to be “very 
sensitive,” specific levels were negotiated that held import growth to less 
than 6 percent for the duration of  the agreement. For example, for the 
very sensitive wool industry U.S. bilaterals under the MFA have pro- 
vided for growth of  no more than 1  percent annually for both subgroup 
and specific item ceilings. 
When the MFA came up for renewal at the end of  1977, the European 
Community (EC) pressed for greater control over developing country 
exports. Unlike the United States who had actively pursued  bilateral 
agreements during the first MFA, the Europeans had no consistent textile 
trade  policy.’2 Consequently,  developing  country  suppliers  increased 
their sales of textile and apparel products to the EC  markets. In large part 
to satisfy EC concerns, the extension protocol renewing the MFA con- 
tained an amendment allowing “jointly agreed reasonable departures” 
from the 6 percent growth rate in quotas as well as from the agreement’s 
“flexibility provisions,”  thus allowing not  only growth at less than 6 
percent but for zero or negative growth in those products considered 
sensitive by importing c~untries.‘~ 
While never formally invoking the “reasonable departures” clause, the 
U.S. government did respond to industry pressure threatening to hinder 
U.S. participation in  the Multilateral  Trade Negotiations  (MTN) by 
reducing some of  the flexibility in existing agreements. On 15 February 
1979  the government issued its Administration Textile Program, referred 
to as the White Paper (U.S. Department of Commerce 1979).‘4  As part of 
this program,  provision was made to limit the use of  the carry-over 
provisions. Specifically, the program states that a “year to year increase 
. . . should  not  normally exceed the previous year’s shipments plus 
one-half of  the unfilled portion of  the previous year’s quota but in no 
event more than the current year’s quota.” Furthermore, the administra- 
tion program promised closer monitoring of import quotas and a renego- 
tiation of  bilateral  agreements to prevent   surge^,"'^  and provided  a 
“snapback  clause”  so that  tariff  concessions negotiated in  the MTN 
would revert to pre-MTN levels if  the MFA was not renewed. 
Under the provisions of the second MFA (MFA 11), the United States 
concluded bilateral restraint agreements with twenty supplying countries 
and agreements with consultative mechanisms with eleven other coun- 
tries. These bilateral agreements resulted in over 80 percent of total U.S. 
imports of textile and apparel products being subject to control by 1980.‘6 
Under MFA 11, the United States negotiated bilateral  agreements 
whereby quotas were set at three levels: at the aggregate level covering all 116  Joseph Pelzman 
textile and apparel products, in two to four broad groups of products, and 
at commodity specific levels. Within these commodity specific limits, the 
quota could be established as either a specific quantitative limit, a mini- 
mum consultation level, a consultation category, an agreed limit, or a 
designated consultation limit :' These quantitative restraints for 1981 are 
listed in table 4.1 for all twenty countries with which the United States 
had such agreements during MFA 11. As the data show, the three major 
suppliers (Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan) had the largest share 
of  the U.S. market. 
The present Multifiber Arrangement (MFA 111) is in its third life cycle. 
As such it represents a culmination of repeated increases in its restrictive- 
ness. According to this latest agreement, future bilaterals will be allowed 
to limit the aggregate growth rate of textile imports to the growth rate of 
the domestic textile market, defined as the growth in  the per capita 
consumption of textiles and apparel (estimated by the industry to be 1.5 
percent). In addition, this MFA allows for the globalization of  quotas'* 
and attempts to continue preferential treatment of  smaller developing 
countries at the expense of the larger developing country exporters. The 
effects of  these provisions will be felt most by  Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
South Korea, who combined  accounted  for 53 percent  of  total U.S. 
restricted textile and apparel imports in 1981. Under the recently com- 
pleted bilateral agreements with one of these large exporters, sensitive 
items bound by specific limits have been limited to growth rates between 
0.5 and 2.0 percent per annum. Smaller exporters, on the other hand, 
have been allowed growth rates exceeding 6 percent.19 
Most industry  specialists would agree that the protection provided 
under the MFA and its predecessor agreements has achieved its intended 
purpose, namely, a reduction in the growth of  imports from restricted 
suppliers. The growth of  textile and apparel imports in quantity is pre- 
sented in table 4.2 for the United States and in table 4.3 for the European 
Community. The data in both tables demonstrate the relative success of 
the various trade restrictions, in that the rate of  growth of  textile and 
apparel imports has been remarkably small. In the post-MFA period, 
1974-81,  total textile imports grew at less than 2 percent per year. For the 
United States, textile imports measured in square-yard equivalents were 
actually lower in 1981  than in 1971. During the same period, the composi- 
tion of U.S. imports changed radically from textiles toward apparel and 
from industrial countries toward imports from the developing countries. 
In the European  Community a concerted effort to control imports 
began only after 1976 and in particular during MFA 11. Thereafter, both 
total  imports and those from the developing countries grew  at very 
modest rates. While total imports during 1976-80  grew at 4.9 percent per 
annum, imports from countries with bilateral agreements grew at only 2.2 
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To  dramatize the degree to which the commodity composition of 
textile imports have shifted in favor of apparel in the United States, the 
ratio of  imports to domestic production for selected textile and apparel 
categories is presented in table 4.4. Comparing these ratios for various 
commodities representing yarn, fabrics, apparel, and made-up goods, the 
degree of  import penetration in apparel is substantially higher. Among 
the apparel products, imports of sweaters, especially those made of wool, 
and shirts and blouses, predominantly for women and girls, rank among 
the highest. In contrast, imports of man-made yarn, broadwoven fabric, 
and knit fabric were quite modest. It would appear that this elaborate 
trade management system is quite successful in its ability to limit the 
market access of textile products where the industrialized countries pos- 
sess comparative advantage, yet far less successful in the apparel area 
where the low-wage, developing countries have a stronger comparative 
advantage. 
4.3  The Restructuring of the Textile Industry 
Traditionally the apparel industry and (to a lesser degree) the textile 
industry have been dominated by a large number of  small and medium 
sized, mostly privately held companies. The minimum scale for efficient 
operation was low. Consequently there were few significant barriers to 
entry, and concentration levels, while varying by subcategory, were far 
below the average for all manufacturing. In the postwar period, both the 
textile and apparel industries underwent  a series of  major, structural, 
demand-and-cost-related changes. The resulting characteristics of  these 
industries are presented in table 4.5. Despite all the changes discussed 
below, both the textile and apparel industries have fairly low concentra- 
tion rates (41 and 28 percent, respectively, in 1979). Furthermore, in both 
industries the import penetration ratio, measured in dollars, is less than 
10 percent, in part because of  the success of the quota system in restrict- 
ing import growth. 
Of the numerous factors having an impact on these industries in the 
postwar period, six factors seem most important. First, with the mass 
introduction and consumer acceptance of  man-made fibers, firms using 
man-made fibers rapidly increased their share of  textile output at the 
expense of  those firms processing natural fibers. Second, changes in 
technology, especially in the conversion of  fibers into yarn and yarn into 
fabrics, led to an increase in the minimum efficient size of  textile plants. 
Similar advances in the apparel stage have been absent primarily because 
of technical constraints. Consequently, the apparel industry is still com- 
posed of many small and medium-sized plants with relatively low scales of 
operation. Third, international trade created new opportunities for ex- 
panding scale economies.  In Europe, the formation of  the European Table 4.1  U.S. Bilateral Quotas and Fulfillment Levels under MFA I1 for 1981 (in thousand equivalent square yards) 
No. 
Restricted 
Imports  Restricted 
of  Total  as a  Imports 
Items  Imports  Percent  as a 
on  Restricted  of  Percent  Country 
Aggre-  Spe-  by  Total  of  Share of 
gate  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  Specific  cific  Specific  Total  Specific  Total  Total 










































































68.5  90.9 
112.4  18.7 
99.5  36.1 
40.1  24.3 
78.8  71.4 
40.8  44.2 
93.4  62.2 
-  - 







































































































86.5  .95 
52.1  .83 
26.1  2.78 
61.8  4.51 
84.4  3.44 
100.0  2.46 
39.2  .63 
70.1  2.39 
62.9  18.20 
38.3  2.44 
100.0  - 
SOURCE:  U.S. Department of  Commerce, Office of  Textiles, Expired Restraints, 7 June 1982. 
NOTES:  A line (-)  indicates no limit imposed. 
Textile groups are normally defined as: 
Group 1 -  Yarns of  cotton, wool, and man-made fibers. 
Group 2 -  Fabrics, made-up goods, and miscellaneous nonapparel products of  cotton, wool, and man-made fibers. 
Group 3 -  Apparel of  cotton, wool, and man-made fibers. 
Group 4 -  Special made-up goods and miscellaneous textile and apparel. For Hong Kong the categories are: 435, 436, 438, 443, 44516, 447/8, 
63314, 635, 63819, 641, 648. Table 4.2  United States Imports of Textile and Apparel Products by Source, 1971-81  (in million equivalent square yards) 
Hong Kong,  Other 
Taiwan,  Devel-  Europe 
South  Latin  oping  and 
Year  Apparel  Textiles  Total  Korea  America  Countriesa  Japan  China  Others 
1971  2,098  3,853  5,951  1,762  293  383  1,691  0.2  1,822 
1972  2,226  4,010  6,236  1,810  369  559  1,249  11  2,238 
1973  2,090  3,035  5,125  1,523  453  635  813  33  1,668 
1974  1,937  2,473  4,410  1,475  422  571  861  84  998 
1975  2,077  1,751  3,828  1,559  362  432  536  141  758 
1976b  2,578  2,560  5,138  2,134  463  708  832  153  848 
1978  2,905  2,835  5,740  2,247  605  776  853  201  1,058 
1979  2,671  1,977  4,648  1,930  512  812  492  231  681 
1980  2,884  3,000  4,884  2,210  461  820  461  325  608 
1981  3,136  2,626  5,762  2,460  543  993  503  562  702 
Average annual growth rates: 
1977”  2,466  2,511  4,977  1,978  418  552  943  91  995 
197  1-8 1  3.6  -  3.4  -0.3  3.0  5.4  8.1  -9.8  18.2  -8.1 
1971-73  -0.1  -7.9  -4.9  -4.8  14.3  16.5  -  23.4  65.9  -2.9 
1973-81  4.4  -1.6  1.3  5.2  2.0  4.9  -5.2  19.8  -9.1 
Percentage share: 
1971  35.2  64.8  100.0  29.6  4.9  6.4  28.4  n.a.  30.6 
1973  40.8  59.2  100.0  29.7  8.8  12.4  15.9  0.6  32.5 
1981  54.4  45.6  100.0  42.7  9.4  17.2  8.7  9.8  12.2 
SOURCES:  International Trade Commission, The History and Current Status of  the Multifiber Arrangement, 1978, Washington, D.C., 1978; International 
Trade Commission, The Multifiber Arrangement, 1973 to 1980, Washington, D.C., 1981; International Trade Commission, U.S.  Imports of  Textile and 
Apparel Products under the Multifiber Arrangement, 1976 to 1981, Washington, D.C., 1982. 
“Defined here as Asia and Africa (except Israel and South Africa). 
bMinor changes in conversion factors for converting garments, yarns, etc., into equivalent square yards took place between 1976 and 1977 when the system 
of  product categories was changed. Table 4.3  European Community Imports of  Textile and Apparel Products, 1973430 (thousand metric tons) 
Countries Covered by the MFA 
Industrial  Countries with  Preferential 
Year  Countries  Agreements  Countries”  Total  Total 
1973  254  n.a.  n.a.  572  826 
1974  334  n.a.  n.a.  752  1,086 
1975  306  n.a.  n.a.  855  1,161 
1976  356  65 1  n.a.  1,093  1,449 
1977  332  598  301  1,001  1,333 
1978  354  598  366  1,072  1,426 
1979  472  697  42 1  1,225  1,697 
1980  526  709  396  1,227  1,753 
Annual growth rates: 
1973-76  11.9  n.a.  n.a.  24.1  20.6 
1976-80  10.3  2.2  9Sb  2.9  4.9 
SOURCES:  Commission of  the European Community,  The European Community’s Textile Trade, Europe Information no. 44/81, Brussels,  1981, and 
unpublished data from the Commission of  the European Community. 
“Includes the products of  the 46 countries of  Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) who receive duty free access to the European Economic 
Community. 
bFor 1977-80. Table 4.4 
Item  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980 





































































































Men’s and boys’ 
Women’s and girls’ 
Wool 
Man-made 
Shirts and blouses: 
Woven 
Shirts and blouses, knit 
Men’s and boys’ 
Women’s and girls’ 
Suits, total: 
Trousers and slacks, total: 
Men’s and boys’ 

































58.7  40.1 
34.6  43.7 
0.5  0.5 
79.0  89.0 
37.0  43.3 
107.4  111.0 
139.7  187.5 
108.2  107.0 
31.4  35.3 
41.1  47.3 
15.8  19.0 
74.4  79.1 
11.8  12.4 
17.0  20.9 
7.5  11.7 

















































































SOURCE:  U.S. Department of  Commerce, International Trade Administration, Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles and Apparel, June 1982. 124  Joseph Pelzman 
Table 4.5  Profile of the U.S.  Textile and Apparel Industries, 1979 (in million 
of dollars except as noted) 
Textile Mill  Apparel and Other 
Products  Textile Products 
(SIC 22)  (SIC 23) 
Number of  establishments in 1977  7,100 
Value of  shipments  46,850 
Total employment (000)  858.2 
Production workers (000)  742.6 
Average hourly earnings  4.87 
Capital expenditure  1,423 
Simple four-firm concentration ratio: 
1965  38% 
1979  41% 
Average 1965-79  39% 
Import penetration ratio:" 
1965  6.77% 
1979  8.16% 
Average annual growth in domestic demand:" 
1965-73  .031% 
1974-79  .042% 
Average annual growth in imports:" 
1965-73  .287% 
1974-79  -  .942% 
26,000 
47,276 












-  .989% 
SOURCE:  U.S. Department of Commerce. 
"Valued in dollars. 
Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association aided 
the industry by providing a larger market. The large internal U.S. market 
together with the Canadian market had already provided U.S.  firms with 
the opportunities for exploiting scale economies. Fourth, many of  the 
smaller, less capital-intensive  textile enterprises, faced with this new 
internal competition, were absorbed by larger, more affluent conglomer- 
ates.  Fifth, the introduction  of  cotton dust  standards in  1974 led  to 
intraindustry changes that forced marginal cotton textile firms to close 
down as a result of  the proposed new regulations. Finally, the entire 
process  of  structural  change  was  undertaken  under  the  protective 
umbrella of  the MFA and its predecessor agreements. These agreements 
were  aimed  at  preserving  the  market  share of  domestic  textile  and 
apparel producers by  limiting the growth of  specific imports. 
The resulting change in the composition of raw materials consumed by 
the textile and apparel industries is well known. Whereas in 1963 man- 
made fibers accounted for 36 percent of  all fibers consumed by the U.S. 
textile industry, by 1980 man-made fibers rose to 75 percent of total fibers 125  The Multifiber Arrangement 
consumed. A similar development occurred in the European Community 
and Japan where  man-made fiber consumption  rose from 26  and 43 
percent to 60 and 67 percent, respectively. This interfiber competition 
had a very pronounced effect on the structure of the textile industry. It 
created a substantial barrier to entry by raising the cost of  a minimum 
efficient plant, especially in the primary stages of  production, namely 
weaving and knitting.Zo 
The shift toward man-made fibers can be attributed to both domestic 
and trade-related factors. First, the advances in polymer technology led 
to lower and more stable man-made fiber prices in contrast to higher 
natural fiber prices. Second, imports of  man-made fiber products began 
to be restricted as early as 1971. Third, consumer tastes shifted in favor of 
easier care fabrics. This combined with technological changes in the use 
of  man-made fibers contributed to the slow but steady collapse of  the 
smaller textile firms primarily producing cotton textiles. 
As mentioned above, the public introduction of  proposed cotton dust 
standards in December 1974 also may have caused some intraindustry 
changes in the textile industry. While the actual rules did not take effect 
till the end of  1980, some analysts believe that the impending rules did 
encourage some textile firms to stop processing cotton. In a recent article, 
Maloney and McCormick (1982) point out that starting in 1974 a redis- 
tribution of  wealth took place within the textile industry, where larger 
firms capable of  adapting to the new cotton dust standards continued 
cotton production while smaller, more marginal firms were driven out of 
the cotton business. 
For many years the textile sector was composed of three major activi- 
ties: the treatment and transformation of raw fibers into yarn, the conver- 
sion of yarn into fabric, and the assembly of fabric into apparel. In large 
part as a result of  the introduction of  man-made fibers, technological 
changes introduced in the 1960s and 1970s have blurred the distinctions 
between  this  troika  production process.  In  cases such as nonwoven 
fabrics, the processes of yarn and fabric production have merged. In cases 
such as seamless hosiery,  certain sweaters, and sheets, yarn is trans- 
formed directly into the finished product. In addition to combining the 
production processes of  certain products, technological changes have 
also altered the way each of  these processes is carried out. In particular, 
the speed with which each operation is performed and the amount of 
automatic transfer between operations has increased. All this has lead to 
a reduction in inventory requirements and in labor usage. It has, on the 
other hand, led to a substantial increase in capital requirements?' 
In both the United States and Europe, increased investments in both 
textiles and apparel have been primarily influenced by steady increases in 
the capital intensity of the textile operation and by industry expectations 
of increased textile demand. From the data presented in table 4.6, the 126  Joseph Pelzman 
Table 4.6  Volume of Gross Fixed Investment in the Textile and Clothing 
Industries, 197&78  (annual averages, million $)" 
Country 
Textile Industry  Apparel Industry 




















































































































SOURCE:  Organization for  Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Textile 
Industry in OECD Countries. 
"At 1975 prices and 1975 exchange rates. 
investment boom in the industry appears to have started in the early 
1970s and culminated in 1974. In the post-1975 recession, investment in 
the textile and apparel industries dropped off substantially from a prere- 
cession annual average of $5.8 billion to a post-1975 level of  $4.0 billion 
for the entire Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). 
The pattern of OECD textile/apparel investment is generally assumed 
to be motivated by a number of factors?*  First, the anticipation of a boom 
in  consumer demand  combined  with  an anticipated reduction in the 
growth of  imports led to the creation of highly capital-intensive excess 
capacities in the production and processing of  man-made fibers. Second, 
advances in the quality of  equipment combined with rising labor costs 
induced many enterprises to renew their capital stock more rapidly. Since 
1975 the emphasis of investment activity has been concentrated on new 127  The Multifiber Arrangement 
processes and on the elimination of bottlenecks. While gross fixed invest- 
ment  has  declined  in  the post-1975 period,  the capital  stock of  the 
industry does not appear to have declined. In fact, the textile industry in 
the OECD, and especially in the United States, has transformed itself 
over the past twenty to twenty-five years from a labor intensive, small- 
scale industry to one that is far more capital-intensive and above all more 
profitable. The same cannot be said, however, for most of  the apparel 
industry, which is still predominantly labor and low-skill intensive. 
Based on the above discussion, the restructuring of the textile (and to a 
lesser extent the apparel) industry apparently can be  attributed to a 
variety of  factors that are not all trade related. Yet the role of the MFA 
cannot be discounted. While it may not have played the major role, it did 
in fact preserve the market share for the domestic apparel industry, which 
is the largest (40 percent) customer of  the U.S. textile industry. 
4.4  Measuring the Impact of the MFA 
A central proposition of economic theory is that, in long-run competi- 
tive equilibrium, resources will be allocated efficiently  when prices equal 
marginal cost and producers earn only normal rates of return. Departures 
from this norm because of  either imperfect competition or government 
intervention (e.g. ,  trade restrictions) should result in an inefficient alloca- 
tion of resources or rates of return above the competitive norm. A major 
area of  industrial organization research has therefore focused on differ- 
ences in market characteristics as determinants of  above-competitive- 
equilibrium profits. The literature in this area has generally confirmed 
that the size distribution of  sellers, the rate of  growth of  demand, and 
barriers to entry are important determinants of  industry pr~fitability?~ 
More recently this literature has incorporated the impact of foreign trade 
on the performance of U.S. manufacturing indu~tries.2~  The central prop- 
osition of  this literature  is quite simple. Actual and potential import 
competition increases the strength of  the competitive process in  the 
domestic market, in effect reducing seller concentration and resulting in 
competitively determined prices and normal profits.  Conversely, one 
could argue that the existence of  fewer foreign competitors or the ex- 
pectation of  fewer foreign competitors leads to higher domestic concen- 
tration  and consequently  to higher than competitive levels of  profit- 
ability. 
While existing studies have  taken  into account  the  role  of  import 
competition (Esposito and Esposito 1971), the role of  exports (Caves, 
Khalizadeh-Shirazi,  and Porter  1975), and the role of  foreign direct 
investment (Pagoulatos and Sorensen 1976), an examination of  the im- 
pact of  Orderly Marketing Agreements, such as the MFA, on industry 
profit performance has not been carried out. By focusing on whether 128  Joseph Pelzman 
U.S. textile and apparel quotas have served to improve the profit per- 
formance of the domestic industry, the following analysis attempts to fill 
this gap in the literature. 
4.4.1  The Empirical Framework 
The industrial organization literature uses multiple regression analysis 
to estimate the relationship between industry profitability, market struc- 
ture, and foreign competition. These equations ordinarily include seller 
concentration, geographic dispersion, economies of  scale, capital re- 
quirements, and market growth of demand as the major structural deter- 
minants of profitability and, at a minimum, the import penetration ratio 
as the foreign variable.25  The theoretical justification for both the domes- 
tic structural variables and the international factors along with a thorough 
explanation of  the model are more than adequately discussed in the 
substantial industrial organization literature cited earlier. Consequently, 
only  a brief  explanation of  the theoretical rationale  for each of  the 
conventional variables is presented here. 
Competitive Performance 
The dependent variable used in the analysis to represent competitive 
performance is the price-cost margin (PCM) which has been successfully 
used in previous industrial organization studies (see, for example, Collins 
and Preston 1968,1969, Kwoka 1977, Mann 1970, and Weiss 1974). This 
proxy of profitability equals profits plus capital costs (calculated as value 
added minus payroll) divided by value of shipments. Consequently, part 
of  the cross-industry variability in profitability will reflect differences in 
capital intensity. To control for this variation in capital costs, the capital 
output ratio is used as an independent variable. The PCM can therefore 
be viewed as an approximation of  a percentage margin of revenue over 
direct 
Economic theory would argue that in a competitive equilibrium, ce- 
teris paribus, interindustry profit rates should equalize. That is, the PCM 
for a perfectly competitive industry in long-run equilibrium would be 
zero, regardless of the level of import competition. The state of competi- 
tion in the textile and apparel industries represents a continuum from 
industries nearly perfectly  competitive  to industries where the joint- 
profit-maximization outcome is approached. Consequently, inequality of 
industry profit rates may indicate differences in the state of  actual and 
expected competition.  Lower actual or expected competition should, 
ceteris paribus,  result in higher profits for that industry. In an open 
economy, Marvel (1980) has demonstrated that an expansion in preim- 
port profitability induces imports to increase, while increases in imports 
tend to reduce ex post domestic profitability. 129  The Multifiber Arrangement 
Capital Intensity 
Because most of  the subsectors of  the textile and apparel industries 
differ in capital intensities and because the dependent variable (PCM) 
subtracts only direct factor costs,  one must take account of  implicit 
capital cost differences between  subindustries.  A capital output ratio 
(KO), calculated as the gross book value of fixed assets divided by value 
of shipments, is therefore included as an independent variable to control 
for the opportunity cost of capital. One would expect the KO ratio to be 
positively related to the price-cost margin. 
A major weakness of the KO ratio is that in rapidly growing industries 
it may not reflect the steady-state equilibrium level of  KO. To minimize 
this problem, value added per production worker (VAP) was added as a 
further independent variable. VAP will further distinguish the varying 
impact of  changes in productivity occurring in both industries during the 
1965-79  period. 
Geographic Dispersion 
To take into account differences in regional concentration of manufac- 
turing activity within the United States, a particularly successful index 
used is one developed by Collins and Preston (CPIN; 1968).  This index of 
regional concentration is calculated as the sum of the absolute differences 
between the percentage of a particular industry’s domestic shipments and 
the population across census regions. Assuming that per capita demand 
for a given industry’s product is distributed at a constant population share 
rate across regions, a high concentration of  an industry in one region 
would imply that the industry product is tradeable. Consequently, in- 
creases in the CPIN index are associated with increased international 
trade and lower price-cost margins. The sign of  CPIN is therefore ex- 
pected to be positive for industries like textiles and apparel where manu- 
facturing is not concentrated in one region of  the United States. 
Growth of Domestic Demand 
Growth  in  industry  demand  (GROWD), calculated  as the  annual 
percentage change in industry shipments, should, ceteris paribus, exhibit 
an independent and positive relationship with industry profits. Theory 
and past empirical evidence support the proposition that when an indus- 
try  experiences  high  growth  in  demand,  firms  may  secure  above- 
competitive profits.  When growth is slow or declining, firms may  be 
compelled to reduce profit margins to maintain adequate levels of  sales. 
Seller Concentration 
The measure of  seller concentration most often used is the four-firm 
concentration ratio (CR4). A generally accepted proposition is that the 130  Joseph Pelzman 
greater the share of industry output controlled by a few firms, the greater 
the probability that these firms will tacitly collude to raise prices above 
long-run average costs. Thus, industry profit rates are likely to be posi- 
tively related to seller concentration?’ 
Economies of Scale 
Oligopoly theory suggests that the greater the output of  an entrant’s 
minimum efficient plant relative to industry output, the higher the barrier 
to entry. Consequently, an economies of scale variable (ECSC) is calcu- 
lated as the ratio  of  the average plant size among the largest plants 
producing 50 percent of the industry’s value of shipments to total value of 
shipments of  the industry. One would expect profits to be positively 
associated with the level of  scale economies. 
Foreign Competition 
Empirical implementation of the structure-conduct-performance para- 
digm of  industrial organization without foreign variables is straightfor- 
ward. However, when foreign trade is introduced as a further constraint 
on above-competitive returns, one must take into account the simultane- 
ity between industry profitability and international trade. As Marvel 
(1980) and White (1974) have pointed out, above-competitive profits by 
domestic manufacturers encourage imports, and a large import share, 
expost,  reduces profits?8 To deal with this  simultaneity problem, an 
expected import penetration ratio (IMPR) is added to the set of indepen- 
dent variables commonly used to explain variations in rates of  return 
among industries. 
Following the lead of Marvel (1980) ,  the expected values for the import 
penetration ratios are estimated from the following equation: 
I\ 
(1)  IMPR = Po + pi  CR4 + p2 KO + p3 AHE 
+ p4 NPWP + ps CPIN , 
where  AHE  is  average hourly  earnings  of  production  workers,  and 
NPWP is nonproduction workers payroll as a percent of  total payroll. 
Because the import penetration ratio (IMPR) is bounded by zero, ordi- 
nary least squares is inappropriate. Consequently, the import penetra- 
tion equation is estimated using a maximum likelihood Tobit pr0cedure.2~ 
A second, equally important problem when introducing international 
trade is how to demonstrate that the restraining effect of imports depends 
on the domestic structure of the textile and apparel industry. That is, of 
one considers these industries to be imperfectly competitive, then in- 
creased imports should restrain above-competitive levels of profitability. 
On the other hand, if  these industries are viewed as inherently competi- 
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no restraining effect from imports. To capture these differential effects of 
imports due to differences in industry concentration, we have followed 
the lead of  Pugel (1980) in assuming that the impact of import competi- 
tion varies interactively with the industry's concentration ratio. Conse- 
quently, the measure of  import competition used is IMPR *  CR4. One 
would expect that in those cases where concentration ratios are high 
n 
IMPR *  CR4 would be negatively related to the price-cost margin?' 
In addition to incorporating the expected import penetration measure, 
we have also added two variables to reflect barriers to foreign competi- 
tion. The first measure is the ad valorem, trade-weighted, nominal tariff 
rate (AVE); the second is a proxy for the MFA. The measure for the 
quota system (MFASL) is calculated as the percent of  an individual 
four-digit-SIC industry's imports subject to specific quantity limits at the 
textile category level. The higher (lower) the percentage of trade subject 
to a ceiling, the greater (lower) the barriers to foreign suppliers, and the 
higher (lower) the price-cost margin would be. That is, if  a large portion 
of a four-digit industry's output is covered by specific import limits under 
the MFA, then it is assumed that the firms in the industry can be quite 
confident, based on the history of textile trade regulations, that imports 
will not  be allowed to grow above the designated  quota ceilings and 
therefore not  grow  as a percentage of  the domestic market.  Conse- 
quently,  domestic textile  and  apparel firms may  be  more likely and 
willing to raise prices and increase profits above the competitive norm. 
These arguments suggest an empirically useful estimating equation for 
the structure-conduct-performance paradigm in the following general 
form: 
- 
PCM =  (YO +  (~1  KO +  (~2  CPIN +  (~3  ECSC +  (~4  GROWD 
(2)  + (~5  CR4 + (~6  VAP +  (Y,  AVE 
+ (~g  (IMPR .  CR4) + ag MFASL ; 
(Y1,  (Y3,  (Y4,  (Y5, (Y6, (Y7,  (Y9 > 0; (Yg <  0; (Y2  0. 
4.5  Empirical Results 
In the present study the textile and apparel industries are defined at 
their  respective  four-digit  SIC levels. As such, our entire  sample is 
composed of  twenty-nine, four-digit textile SIC categories and thirty- 
three, four-digit apparel SIC categories over the fifteen-year period of 
1965-79.3' The major drawback of  such a limited sample, apart from the 
lack of  universal applicability, is the high degree of  homogeneity of the 
four-digit categories within each industry?z Furthermore, given that our 
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apparel industries in the six-year period of  1974-79,  a consistent set of 
observations over time series and cross sections is not sufficient for an 
efficient estimate of  either a time-series or a cross-section equation. 
Therefore, the estimation of equation (2) can only be obtained by pooling 
cross-section  and  time-series  observations  for  the  pre-MFA  period 
(1965-73)  and  the  post-MFA  period  (1974-79)  for  each  of  the 
indu~tries.3~  The pooling procedure used is commonly termed a cross- 
sectionally  correlated  and  time-wise autoregressive  model.  The  be- 
havioral characteristics of  this model are well known and need not be 
restated here?4 
Parameter estimates for both the textile and the apparel industries for 
the pre- and post-MFA periods are presented in table 4.7. In general, the 
results based on MFASL (the quota variable) suggest that the existence 
of  the MFA did in fact improve the profit performance of the protected 
textile and apparel sectors. 
4.5.1  Foreign Factors 
The central concern of this paper is to determine whether the MFA had 
a positive impact on the profit performance of  the domestic textile and 
apparel industries. The results as demonstrated by  the coefficient of 
MFASL (ag)  presented in table 4.7 suggest that for both industries the 
MFA had a positive and significant impact on industry performance?’ 
One can therefore argue that  by  providing market certainty for the 
domestic textile and apparel industries the MFA did improve their profit 
performance during 1974-79. 
Two other foreign variables of  some concern are the trade-weighted, 
ad valorem, nominal tariff rate (AVE) and the proxy for import competi- 
tion (IMPR *  CR4). The empirical results of these two variables were far 
short of  expectation. While the coefficient of AVE (a7)  was positive in 
three out of four cases, it was significantly different from zero only during 
the post-MFA period for the textile industry and only during the pre- 
MFA period for the apparel industry. The proxy for import competition 
was insignificant in all cases and of  the wrong sign in three out of four 
cases. These results suggest that an increase in import penetration did not 
have a negative impact on the profit performance of  either the textile or 
apparel industries. On the other hand, the positive and significant results 
of the tariff measure (in two cases) suggest that in addition to the positive 
influence of the MFA on the textile industry, high tariff rates also contri- 
buted positively to the profit performance of  the industry.  The most 
surprising  aspect of  these results was that while the MFA positively 
contributed to the profit performance of  the apparel industry during 
1974-79,  high nominal tariffs significantly detracted from the industry’s 
profit performance. 
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Table 4.7  Determinants of Textile and Apparel Industry Performance Using 
Pooled Cross-Section, Time-Series Data for the Pre- and Post-MFA 
Periods 
Textiles  Apparel 
Pre-MFA  Post-MFA  Pre-MFA  Post-MFA 
























































































NOTES:  t-values are in parentheses. Summary of goodness-of-fit statistics, especially R2,  are 
not reported because an interpretable R2  when using generalized least-squares estimation 
does not exist. 
"The estimated coefficient is multiplied by 100. 
4.5.2  Domestic Factors 
For the most part, the domestic market structure variables did not 
perform as expected. The coefficients  of  the capital output ratio (KO) for 
the textile and apparel industries in the pre-MFA period are not statisti- 
cally significant, although positive as is generally predicted. In the post- 
MFA period for the textile industry the coefficient  is negative and statisti- 
cally significant. For the apparel industry it is positive and statistically 
insignificant. Part of  the explanation for this result  rests on the low 
variation in the KO variable. 134  Joseph Pelzman 
A somewhat more interesting result can be seen in the geographic 
dispersion variable (CPIN). In general, past empirical evidence supports 
the proposition that the higher the geographic dispersion index, the more 
likely the given commodity will be traded internationally, and the lower 
the price-cost margin. However, for the textile and apparel industries 
where production in the United States has not been concentrated in a 
single region, the coefficient on CPIN is of the expected sign (positive) for 
both the pre- and post-MFA periods, although insignificant in all four 
cases. Therefore no inference can be drawn from this variable. 
The results of the economies of scale (ECSC) and the value added per 
production worker (VAP) variables are mixed. It is generally accepted 
that in the 1970s the scale of operation in both the textile and the apparel 
industries was increasing with  the significant improvements  in labor 
productivity. This is reflected, in part, in the industry-specific  results. For 
both industries the coefficient on VAP is positive and significant in both 
the pre- and post-MFA periods. The coefficient on ECSC is positive for 
both industries, although significant only in the pre-MFA period for the 
apparel industry. 
A further mixed result is that the coefficient on the growth of domestic 
demand variable (GROWD)  is positive, although statistically significant 
only for the textile industry in the post-MFA period. Finally, given the 
low level of  concentration in the two industries, it is not surprising that 
the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) is not significantly different from 
zero in three out of four cases. However, a negative sign was unexpected. 
The low  variation  in  the data may  be  one explanation, but  not  the 
overriding one. 
4.6  Conclusion 
The MFA was only one factor among many others impacting the U.S. 
textile and apparel industries. Nevertheless, the MFA’s role stands out 
because it is distinct from the other factors in its attempt to secure the 
market for the domestic textile and apparel industries. As such, one 
would expect that by  limiting competition the MFA would positively 
affect the performance of  the U.S. textile and apparel industries. The 
results suggest that in fact that was the case. This positive impact arises 
from the MFA’s ability to control the growth in  imports,  as was its 
intention. Having  determined that the MFA was indeed a successful 
protective instrument of the United States, the next important question 
to be answered is: What has this success cost? 135  The Multifiber Arrangement 
Appendix 
Annual observations for our domestic and foreign variables by four-digit, 
output-based Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories over the 
period 1965-79  were taken from generally available published sources. 
Data on the quota enforcement were obtained from the U.S.  Department 
of  Commerce,  Office of  Textiles.  Our entire data base  consisted of 
twenty-nine, four-digit textile categories (combining SIC 2257 and 2258 
after 1972) and thirty-three, four-digit apparel categories over fifteen 
years, or a total of  930 observations. The variables are: 
PCM = (VA -  PA)NS: Price-cost margin; where VA = value added, 
PA = payroll, and VS = value of  shipments; obtained from Census of 
Manufactures  (CM) and the Annual  Survey  of  Manufactures  (ASM), 
various years. 
KO = GBVFANS: Capital output ratio; where GBVFA = gross book 
value of  fixed assets; obtained from CM. The values for the intercensus 
period were derived by interpolation. 
CPIN = X:=  I (VS,/VS) -  (Pop,/Pop)l: Geographic dispersion; where i 
= the four census regions, and Pop = population; derived from CM. The 
values for the intercensus period were derived by  interpolation. 
GROWD = % A VS: Growth in domestic demand; derived from both 
ASM and CM. 
VAP = (VA/Prod): Value added per production worker; where Prod = 
the number of production workers; obtained from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS). 
AVE: Ad valorem, trade-weighted, nominal tariff rates; obtained from 
the U.S. Department of  Labor. 
CR4: The four-firm concentration ratio; obtained from both ASM and 
CM. The values for the intercensus period were derived by interpolation. 
ECSC: Economies of  scale derived as AVSIVS, where AVS = average 
plant size among the largest plants producing 50 percent of the industry’s 
value of  shipments; obtained from CM. The values for the intercensus 
period were derived by interpolation. 
IMPR = VMIVS + VM -  VX: Import penetration ratio; where VM = 
value of imports and VX = value of exports; obtained from BLS and the 
Office of  Foreign Economic Research (OFER), computer tapes. 
IMPR: The expected import penetration ratio estimated from equation 
I\ 
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GROWD =  % AVM:  Growth in  imports; derived  from trade data 
provided by  BLS and OFER. 
MFASL: Share of an individual four-digit-SIC industry’s imports subject 
to a specific quota. The quota levels by country and textile category were 
obtained from the U.S. Department of  Commerce, Office of  Textiles. 
These textile categories are defined by the United States for monitoring 
imports of textile and apparel products. They were converted to seven- 
digit TSUSA items using U.S. Department of Commerce, Industry and 
Trade  Administration,  Office  of  Textiles,  Correlation:  Textile  and 
Apparel  Categories  Tariff  Schedules  of  the  United States,  Annotated. 
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979. The individual TSUSA items were then 
converted to output-based SIC categories using a concordance provided 
by the U.S.  Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Economic Research. 
While this concordance process is theoretically correct, the addition and 
deletion of  both textile categories and SIC categories in the mid-1970s 
may  have  created  some  problems.  Furthermore,  for  1965-1973  no 
attempt is made to include the quota on cotton because there the con- 
cordance is far less reliable. 
Notes 
1. A recent survey of such changes is presented in Pelzman (1982). Note, however, that 
the degree of  change varies considerably across the textile and apparel industries. 
2. Despite the shrinking of  the U.S. textile industry between  1910 and 1955, it still 
remained an important industrial sector. In  the late 1950s and early 1960s it represented 6.0 
percent of manufacturing employment and 4.0  percent of  manufacturing output. Combined 
with the apparel industry, which accounted for an additional 7.0 percent of manufacturing 
employment and 3.6 percent of manufacturing output, the enlarged textile complex repre- 
sented a substantial interest group. In 1980 the same complex represented 10.6 percent of 
manufacturing employment and 5.6 percent of  manufacturing output. In addition to these 
economic facts, the enlarged complex when combined with fiber producers represented a 
well-organized political pressure group, with strong influences in the industrial Northeast in 
the 1960s and in the low-wage areas of  the Southeast in the 1970s and 1980s. 
3.  For an in-depth discussion of  the MFA and its development, see Keesing and Wolf 
(1980), Pelzman (1980),  and U.S. ITC (1978). All of the agreements beginning with the 
Japanese voluntary export controls cover both textile and apparel products. 
4. In 1957 Japanese cotton textile and apparel exports accounted for over 60 percent of 
total U.S.  imports. These exports were concentrated in cotton ginghams and velveteens. In 
response to these increased  imports, the U.S. textile industry filed four escape clause 
petitions with the U.S.  Tariff Commission between January and June 1956. For more details 
see U.S. ITC (1978, 1-5). 
5. By  “orderly” the administration  meant a system whereby the developed  country 
producers would not be subjected to competition from lower-cost producers. 
6.  The bilateral  agreements negotiated  under  the LTA were  contrary both  to the 
principles of nondiscrimination of article I and to the safeguards provision of  article XIX of 
the GATT. 137  The Multifiber Arrangement 
7. Under  the LTA, quotas could be either agreed on jointly or be imposed by the 
importing country. The usual course by which quotas were imposed by the United States 
was to first set specific limits on a limited set of  items under article 3 (whether unilateral or 
negotiated) and then to follow up with a more comprehensive bilateral agreement under 
article 4. Quotas imposed under article 3 were initially set at the actual level of  imports 
during  the year ending three months prior  to the consultation call. These quotas were 
generally  increased  by  5  percent a year.  Under article 4 a much more comprehensive 
agreement was possible, thus limiting the imports of cotton from major developing country 
exporters even more. 
8. Two major events occurred during 1961-72 which affected the operation of  the LTA. 
First, there was a very rapid increase in the use and trade of  man-made fibers which were not 
covered under the  LTA. Second, new entrants into the market were heavily concentrated in 
apparel which also was not very well protected under the LTA. 
9.  The text of  the MFA can be found in U.S. ITC (1978, appendix A). 
10. The disposition of  unused quotas is determined by the individual bilateral agree- 
ment. In general countries are allowed to borrow a total of 11 percent against a commodity- 
specific limit or aggregate limit. The distribution of  that 11 percent between forward and 
backward borrowing is determined by the bilateral. In most cases it is 6 percent forward and 
5 percent backward. 
11. By  “equitable” the authors of  the MFA meant that it provided  for a small but 
guaranteed 6 percent expansion in the exports of developing countries. By all accounts, this 
quota system was and remains highly inequitable because it denies market access to  efficient 
producers. 
12. The delay to negotiate bilateral agreements by the EC  member states was in part due 
to their lack of  agreement over the allocation of  imports within the European Community. 
Furthermore, the EC debate over comprehensive or selective agreements delayed an EC 
trade position vis-a-vis textiles. 
13. In the original MFA there was flexibility for switching quotas among years (carry- 
over and carry-forward) as well as among textile categories (swing). This flexibility provi- 
sion was under attack both in the United States and the European Community for providing 
the potential for “surges” in developing country exports of  so-called sensitive products. In 
MFA I1 the major suppliers were induced to give up these flexibility provisions in their most 
important categories. In addition, in those categories where the quotas were not filled, the 
new  bilaterals  eliminated  specific quotas,  substituting  instead  consultation  provisions 
whereby the United States could impose quotas at levels below the original quotas but 
higher than existing trade. 
14. The Administration Textile Program or the so-called White Paper was issued on 15 
February 1979. 
15. By limiting “surges” the administration intended to: (a) limit the carry-over provi- 
sions, (b) impose designated consultation levels, and (c) list categories considered to be 
sensitive and subject to a consultation or to an agreed limit. 
16. It is difficult to determine what in fact the quota system has controlled. While it is 
true that over 80 percent of  total U.S. textile and apparel imports in both 1980  and 1981  were 
controlled by the aggregate limit, imports in both years under specific limits represented 
slightly over 50 percent of  total imports. 
17. The difference between these limits is very subtle. Quotas set as either specific limits 
or agreed limits are for all practical purposes specific quotas. Items designated by minimum 
consultation levels are threshold markers which when crossed allow the United States to  call 
a consultation for the purpose of setting a quota limit. Categories designated consultation 
categories do not have quotas set, but are considered sensitive items subject to a quota. 
18. “Globalization  of  quotas”  means a  system  where  the importing  country sets a 
maximum quantity for the level of  imports based either on growth of  imports vis-his 
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the bilateral negotiations the importing country can allocate shares based on the premise, 
for instance, that new entrants (with no proven comparative advantage) be given greater 
access to the U.S.  market. The above scenario was presented as a viable option by Shelley 
Appleton, secretary-treasurer, International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, before the 
Trade Subcommittee, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S.  House of  Representatives, 21 
July 1980. During MFA I1 the European Community did in fact impose such a global system 
for what they considered very sensitive items. 
19. The recent bilateral agreement with Hong Kong imposed specific limits on twenty- 
seven categories, limiting growth rates between 0.5 percent to 2.0 percent per annum. Of 
these twenty-seven  categories,  nineteen will  allow for  only  the minimum  0.5  percent 
growth. On the other hand, bilateral agreements with Pakistan, Mexico, and Singapore 
limit  the growth  of  specific limits  to 7 percent, 7 percent, and 5  percent per annum 
respectively. 
20.  These developments are discussed  at some length  in both Pelzman  (1980) and 
OECD (1981). 
21.  For an excellent discussion of  the adjustment process in the textile  and apparel 
industries as it applies to trade and protection, see Glismann et al. (1983). The subject of 
technological change is presented in great detail in Boon (1981). 
22.  Some of these factors are noted in OECD (1981,72-77).  Note that without detailed 
data or an appropriate investment model, these factors are merely speculative. 
23.  See, for example, Collins and Preston (1968, 1969), Kwoka (1977), Mann (1970), 
Miller (1967), Rhoades and Cleaver (1973), and Stigler (1964). An  extensive bibliography is 
included in Weiss (1974) and Scherer (1980). 
24.  See, for example, Esposito and Esposito (1971), Pagoulatos and Sorensen (1976), 
and more recently Pugel (1980) and Marvel (1980). 
25.  Other variables commonly used to explain interindustry differences in profitability 
include:  consumer-producer distinctions,  advertising/sales  ratios, inventory/sales ratios, 
and buyer concentration. A full list of variables and the relevant literature is presented in 
Scherer (1980, chap. 9). These variables were excluded from this analysis primarily because 
they do not apply to our particular industry sample. 
26. One can think of  the PCM variable  as a good proxy for the Lerner measure of 
monopoly power.  That is, PCM  = (TR  ~  TVC)/TR, where payroll plus  the cost of 
materials is a good proxy for variable cost (TVC). Value added is defined by census as the 
value of  shipments plus services rendered minus cost of materials, supplies and containers, 
fuel, purchased electrical  energy, and contract  work. Therefore, TR - TVC can  be 
approximated by VA -  Payroll. Accounting rates of return, such as rates of return on assets 
and equity, are frequently used  as alternative  indices of  monopoly power  and market 
performance. However, as Fisher and McGowan (1982) have shown, using accounting rates 
of  return is valid only to the extent that profits are indeed monopoly profits or are economic 
profits.  Given the fact that the actual state of  competition  in the textile  and apparel 
industries  is between these two polar cases, it was decided to use PCM as a proxy of domestic 
industry profitability. 
27.  Other measures of concentration including individual firm market shares, eight-firm 
concentration ratios,  and the Herfindahl-Hirschman  index have been used  with  some 
strikingly different results. Given our concern with the impact of  the trade variables and in 
particular the impact of  the MFA, it was decided to use the four-firm concentration ratio. 
This debate concerning different measures of  concentration is presented in Scherer (1980, 
chap. 9). 
28.  Assuming that the domestic industry is not perfectly competitive and that foreign 
firms are not subject to entry limitations which result in domestic market power, White 
(1974)  has shown  that  import shares  are expected  to be positively  related to above- 
competitive profit rates earned by domestic firms. In a perfectly competitive environment 139  The Multifiber Arrangement 
one would expect that above-normal profits would encourage entry from domestic sources 
as well, resulting in lower concentration and hence lower profits. 
29.  Related work by Marvel (1980) and DeRosa and Goldstein (1981) have successfully 
used a similar specification to predict import penetration. The results of  this estimated 
equation are not reported here, but they are available from the author. 
30.  Some would argue that in the textile and apparel industries concentration rates are 
low, implying that domestic competition is high. In this case import competition may not 
affect profit rates but may rather drive marginal firms out of business. 
31.  Data sources for all the variables are presented in the appendix. 
32.  The impact of that homogeneity is that the variance in the PCM as well as in the 
independent variables is small. 
33.  One could argue that the MFA actually  started in  1971 when the United States 
signed bilateral  agreements with  Japan, Hong Kong,  Taiwan,  and Korea designed to 
control not only the exports of  cotton but also of  wool and man-made textile and apparel 
products. However, given the lack of  data on the level of constraints in these agreements 
during 1971-73, it was decided to date the MFA as of  the 1974 agreements for which data 
were available. 
34.  One should not ignore the fact that pooling cross-section and time-series data has its 
own set of problems. In particular, difficulty arises because the disturbance term is likely to 
consist of time-series-related disturbances, cross-section disturbances, and a combination of 
both. The particular pooling procedure used here allows cross-section disturbances to be 
mutually correlated and heteroskedastic and allows time-series disturbances to be autore- 
gressive. See Kmenta (1971, 512-14). 
35.  Throughout the paper statistical significance is taken to be at the 5 percent level. 
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Comment  David G. Tarr 
The Pelzman paper is divided into descriptive and model sections. I 
found the descriptive section of  the paper informative and useful. For 
example, his description of the industry noted that the minimum efficient 
size of textile firms has increased such that a restructuring of the industry 
has occurred. Textiles and apparel are now very different in that we now 
export textiles, and textiles are regarded as an internationally competi- 
tive industry. One question I have is, since much of  U.S.  exports are to 
Europe, would our net export position change significantly if Europe did 
not have restraints on imports from the developing countries? 
The problems I have with the Pelzman paper are that the paper does 
not provide estimates of the variables its title leads one to expect and that 
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no model of  the industry is developed. In fact the paper is a test on the 
textile industry of  the structure-conduct-performance paradigm of  in- 
dustrial organization. In this context the paper is a reasonable effort, but 
problems remain. 
What estimates did I expect this paper to provide? I expected among 
other things to find estimates of the changes in output, employment, and 
profit in the textile industry induced by the MFA. I hoped that estimates 
of  costs to consumers and deadweight losses to the economy would be 
provided. To my  surprise, no such estimates were either provided  or 
attempted. The reason no such estimates were provided or attempted is 
that no industry model is developed, in any real sense, from which these 
estimates may be derived. 
Let me be more specific. If  you were interested in determining the 
effects of the MFA on output ,  employment, profit, and price in the textile 
industry, how would you proceed? I would start with specification of  a 
supply equation and a demand equation for the industry. One would 
hypothesize  how  the MFA affects the demand equation and enter it 
accordingly. (I call this an “industry” model.) Solving for the reduced 
form and estimating would yield estimates of  the relevant parameters, 
including the coefficient for the effect of the quota. With the parameters 
estimated (and successfully tested), one could estimate (or simulate) the 
effects of  the quota by recalculating the new equilibrium with different 
quota values plugged in. The changes in output, employment, profit, and 
prices attributable to the MFA could be calculated. Admittedly, this is 
not an easy process. It is also not the only way to proceed; but I had hoped 
to see something along these lines. 
Pelzman states early on that resource constraints precluded the de- 
velopment of such a model in his paper. Instead he attempts to estimate 
the effect of  a number of  variables, including the MFA, on price-cost 
margins in the textile and apparel industries. In taking this approach, he 
precludes himself from answering what I believe to be the most important 
questions regarding the effects of  the MFA. 
Instead of a true industry model, Pelzman tests the structure-conduct- 
performance  (SCP) paradigm of  industrial organization on the textile 
industry. Price-cost margins are regressed on about ten variables tradi- 
tionally employed in SCP tests. How the parameter estimates relate to 
any underlying structure is unknown, because no structural equations are 
specified. (That is, no SCP structural model, as opposed to an industry 
model as mentioned above, is developed.) Indeed why some variables 
enter the model at all or enter with the hypothesized sign is a point of 
confusion. This problem  manifests itself  very  strongly when  the pa- 
rameters are estimated. 
More fundamentally,  there  appears to be  confusion regarding  the 
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industrial organization (with international variables), then why restrict 
oneself to the textile industry? Presumably the purpose of  such an exer- 
cise is to make conclusions about whether concentration, or imports, or 
barriers to entry affect price-cost margins or profits. Restricting oneself to 
the textile industry severely limits the size of the sample and the range of 
the variables, such as the four-firm concentration ratio. 
Before discussing the empirical results, I should add that Intrilligator 
and Weston (1975) have shown that it is possible to specify and estimate a 
simultaneous-equations model of  the SCP paradigm of  industrial orga- 
nization. Without going into details, their results show that there are a 
number  of  important  differences  between  single-equation  and  mul- 
tiequation  estimation techniques in this field, which suggest that the 
failure of single-equation methods to account for simultaneity bias casts 
serious doubt on single-equation studies of  the SCP paradigm. Pugel 
(1978) has also done a simultaneous-equations model test of  the SCP 
paradigm in which he explicitly incorporated international trade vari- 
ables.  Thus  reasonable  multiequation  SCP  models,  starting  with  a 
structural specification and including most of  the important variables 
modeled by Pelzman, exist in the literature, suggesting that a fuller model 
in this instance is not an impossible task. 
Regarding the empirical results, I shall interpret them in the context of 
a test of the SCP paradigm on the textile industry rather than as evidence 
of  resource allocation shifts due to the MFA. For the reasons I have 
mentioned, this is the only way the results can be meaningfully inter- 
preted. 
The capital output ratio was included as a measure of barriers to entry 
and was hypothesized to have a positive coefficient. The estimated coef- 
ficient was found to be insignificant. First, I note that Intrilligator and 
Weston (1975) have found that the capital intensity variable is especially 
susceptible to simultaneity bias. 
But part of the problem is at the theoretical level. I believe that a high 
capital output ratio is not very reflective of  barriers to entry. Following 
the recent work of Fisher (1979), a barrier to entry is said to exist if  and 
only if entry would be socially beneficial but is somehow prevented. This 
is a definition of  a barrier to entry in terms of the results one would like to 
see obtain. A high capital output ratio is reflective of  the necessity of 
making a large investment to enter. Is that a barrier to entry? Assuming 
firms can borrow at rates that correctly reflect perceptions of risk, firms 
will enter depending on whether long-run anticipated profits will justify 
their initial large investments. This is the calculation one would make on 
behalf of  society, so the capital output ratio is not a barrier to entry. 
Regarding the empirical results, if  it is not a barrier to entry, it does not 
preserve abnormally high profits or  prices, so we should not expect to find 
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Pelzman finds that the four-firm concentration  ratio either had the 
wrong sign or was not statistically significant. He argues, with reason, 
that given the low levels of  concentration among the industries sampled, 
this is an unsurprising result. 
Regarding  the  foreign  non-MFA  variables,  perverse results  were 
obtained. An increase in imports  was found to be either insignificant or to 
increase price-cost margins. Similarly the variable measuring,  interac- 
tively, the influence of  imports and concentration achieved mixed and 
nonsupporting  results  regarding  its  influence  on price-cost  margins. 
Although Pelzman follows Pugel (1978) by including an interactive rela- 
tionship between import share and concentration (i.e., a competitive or 
unconcentrated industry would already have low price-cost margins that 
would not be significantly lowered by a higher share of  imports), Pelzman 
uses the change in  the share of  imports rather than the import share 
directly. Since a country could have a large change in imports starting 
from a small base and have little effect on the price-cost margins, it is the 
latter measure which would seem to  have the most relevance. Moreover, 
if  one believes  that imports must  only  enter interactively,  then why 
include a separate variable for noninteractive imports? This is a man- 
ifestation of the more general problem mentioned above: One would like 
to know what structural model the author has in mind that leads to this 
form of  the estimating  equation. A  properly  specified  model  would 
almost certainly yield a different estimating equation and might find, as 
did  Pugel  (1978) and Marvel  (1980), that imports restrain  price-cost 
margins in concentrated industries. 
Pelzman finds that the MFA restrictions result  in  higher  price-cost 
margins. This is the most important result of the paper, but, lacking an 
industry model, we do not know the effect on output, employment, and 
profits. 
In conclusion, I found the descriptive sections useful, but I believe it is 
necessary to specify and estimate a model of the industry if one wishes to 
obtain estimates of the effects of  the MFA on resource allocation in the 
textile  and  apparel  industries.  As  a  test  of  the  structure-conduct- 
performance paradigm of industrial organization, it is a useful addition to 
the literature; but the lack of  a structural SCP model here as well leads to 
problems that cause the paper to fall short of  being a very significant 
contribution in this limited area. 
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Comment  Martin Wolf 
These remarks will cover three areas: first, the paper itself; second, issues 
that could have been discussed in the paper but were not; and, finally, the 
wider implications of  the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA). 
Analysis of  the Paper 
Professor Pelzman’s paper is divided into three principal sections: a 
discussion of  the MFA; a review of  the evolution of  the textile  and 
clothing industries; and an econometric analysis of  the impact of import 
restrictions and other factors on the profitability of  the various branches 
of  the textile and clothing industries. The paper hypothesizes that “by 
limiting competition the MFA would positively affect the performance of 
the U.S. textile and apparel industries.”  It concludes that “the results 
suggest that in fact that was the case.” The discussion below concentrates 
on the econometric analysis, but begins with the historical sections. 
History of  the MFA 
The paper provides a good account of  the evolution of  the MFA and 
brings out two important points: first, the primary role that the United 
States has played in its creation and development; second, the central 
place of  bilaterally agreed export quotas. The latter feature ensures that 
exporters have some leverage in bargaining as well as the opportunity to 
extract the scarcity rent created by the quotas. 
Only one point needs qualification. In general, as Professor Pelzman 
notes, imports of  apparel from developing countries have grown much 
more rapidly  than those of  textiles.  The main reason  for this is the 
stronger comparative advantage of  developing countries in the former 
than in the latter (Keesing and Wolf 1980, chap. 2). Thus, textile imports 
grew more slowly than those of  apparel not so much because the trade 
management  system is  “quite  successful” in this  area,  as the paper 
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suggests, but because of a lack of developing country competitiveness in 
most textile products. It would probably be more accurate to conclude 
that the system curbed but-at  least until recently-did  not prevent the 
consequences of  developing countries’ comparative advantage in cloth- 
ing, while it was largely redundant in the case of textiles, at least after the 
mid-  1960s. 
Restructuring of  the Textile Industry 
Professor Pelzman’s discussion brings out the rapid technical change in 
the textile industry but the much slower change in the clothing industry. 
This itself  suggests that protection  had  a modest  effect on technical 
change, since it was in the relatively less protected textile sectors rather 
than the generally more protected-because  more vulnerable-clothing 
sectors that the increases in capital intensity were greatest. 
Impact of  the MFA 
The empirical technique employed in an investigation of the effects of a 
number of  independent variables, including import restraints, on the 
profitability of segments of the textile and apparel industries. A number 
of  methodological issues arise, but the remarks made below are con- 
cerned almost exclusively with the specification of  the model: 
(a) The price-cost margin (PCM) is not a logical measure of profitabil- 
ity. It is rather the rate of  return on capital across sectors that might be 
distorted from a hypothesized equality by the factors enumerated in the 
paper. The PCM variable should, therefore, have been divided by the 
capital output ratio (KO). 
(b)  Value added per worker (VAP) presumably captures comparative 
advantage. As such it is important, but in the present equation its high 
significance may be because profits are included in both the dependent 
and this independent variable. Furthermore, there is presumably col- 
linearity between this variable and the capital output ratio. Wages per 
worker might have been a better variable to use as a proxy for human 
capital intensity when the physical capital output ratio is also included as 
an independent variable. 
(c)  Concentration may lead to higher wages rather than higher profits, 
which could be one reason why the concentration variable (CR4) per- 
forms poorly. More seriously, the relevant factor is, of course, potential 
competition. If barriers to entry are fairly low throughout the industries, 
measured concentration ratios may be of  little economic significance. 
(d)  The import penetration ratios do not work well as explanatory 
variables. While the two-stage estimation technique used is a sensible 
way of  dealing with the simultaneous relation between import penetra- 
tion ratios and profitability, the equation for import penetration ratios in 
terms of  the exogenous variables is puzzling. Particularly striking in the 
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dently of  the import penetration  variables in equation (1) and is not 
included in equation (2), although one would expect the effect of  these 
restrictions to be via their impact on import penetration ratios. However, 
an additional simultaneity problem is involved in the use of  the MFA 
variable, since low profits are likely to lead to the imposition of  restric- 
tions, which then raise profits ceteris paribus. A further equation explain- 
ing the imposition of MFA restraints in terms of the exogenous variables 
is needed. 
(e) Finally, it is difficult to argue that the appropriate break between 
the two periods for the United States is after 1973.  The United States had 
effective restraints on major suppliers in all three fibers by  1971. 
In sum, while the analysis comes up with the desired result that MFA 
restraints raised profitability, there is sufficient doubt about the specifica- 
tion to throw similar doubt on the conclusion. 
Issues That Need To Be Considered 
Because of  the limited focus of  the paper, a number of  important 
questions remain to be explored: 
(a) According  to the paper,  average annual capital  investment  in 
textiles and clothing between 1970 and 1980  was $1.5 billion in the United 
States. Is a large proportion of  this explained by protection? 
(b)  What was the social rate of  return on the resources invested? 
(c)  What  effect did protection  have on the factor intensity of  the 
industry and especially on technical change? 
(d)  Finally,  to what  extent did  technical change and  capital-labor 
substitution nullify the purported employment benefits of the restraints? 
These questions need further exploration by analysts interested in the 
impact of  the MFA on the protected industries. 
Implications of  the MFA 
The present MFA is the heir of export restraints on textiles imposed in 
the 1950s. This treatment of  textiles used to be considered exceptional, 
but as similar devices have sprouted in other sectors-steel,  automobiles, 
consumer electronics, and footwear, for example-the  “exception” has 
become  less exceptional. In fact, the MFA is beginning to look  in- 
creasingly like a precedent  rather than an exception. This raises two 
questions: First, why did the U.S. government get involved in construct- 
ing export cartels against its own citizens? Second, what general lessons 
can be learned from the evolution of  the textile restraint arrangements 
toward their current convoluted state (Wolf 1982)? 
Why Export Restraints? 
In trying to understand how the system of  export restraints grew up 
within textiles and then spilled over into other sectors, one learns a great 148  Joseph Pelzman 
deal about the weak elements in the liberalization of  commercial policy 
after World War 11. Three points are relevant: 
(a) The goal  of  successive administrations  has  been  conservative, 
namely, to preserve the core of  the agreements to liberalize trade from 
the infection of overly powerful lobbies. By creating such special arrange- 
ments, it has been hoped that domestic textile interests and subsequently 
those of  other industries would be politically “sterilized.” 
(b) Another objective of  successive administrations has been to pre- 
serve executive autonomy in trade policy matters by avoiding a request to 
Congress for authority to control imports directly, which is thought to 
have incalculable consequences. 
(c)  Finally, the device used buys off all existing significant producers in 
both importing and exporting countries. This, in turn, makes it politically 
the easiest form of  protection to maintain. 
In effect, the system is the consequence of  taking the path of  least 
political resistance over a long period. 
What Are the Lessons? 
There are two points, the first is relevant to the longstanding discussion 
of selectivity in safeguard protection, the second concerns the evolution- 
ary tendencies of  sectoral arrangements of  this kind. 
The MFA was intended to provide a balance of  advantage between 
importers and exporters. It certainly embodied many explicit restraints 
on the actions of  the former. Yet over time these restraints have been 
steadily whittled away, each derogation acting as a precedent for the 
next, with the result that the previously almost unthinkable notion of 
cutbacks in quotas is now completely acceptable. The experience sug- 
gests that restraints on the way  that selective protection can be im- 
plemented decay over time, largely because of the imbalances of  power 
between the importers and the particular exporter against whom action is 
taken. The crucial step then is the grant of  international legitimacy to 
selective action. Once this had been given in the case of  textiles, the 
proliferation  of  restraints and the erosion of  safeguards against their 
abuse seem to have acquired an irresistible momentum. 
This experience also says something about sectoral systems, especially 
those involving discrimination. Over time the exclusion of  outsiders is 
increasingly successful, as a dense network of  bureaucrats and industry 
lobbyists construct an independent and extremely complex structure of 
protection. Within the system there is something for almost everyone, at 
least when compared with other systems of  protection. The exceptions 
are the governments of  importing countries, who are happy to sacrifice 
the potential tariff revenue to obtain the acquiescence of exporters, and 
the governments of potentially successful, restricted exporters with small 
current quotas, who usually have little weight. In consequence, such 149  The Multifiber Arrangement 
systems will not be liberalized from inside and are not allowed to be 
liberalized from outside. A recent paper which I coauthored asks whether 
the MFA will last indefinitely (Curzon et al. 1981). The only plausible 
answer is in the affirmative. 
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